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Abstract 
 
In 2013 and 2015, the Supreme Court of the United States (US)1 and Australian High 
Court,2 respectively, rejected the patentability of isolated genes.3 Subsequently, in 
March 2016 a case in the Federal Court of Canada involving the Children’s Hospital 
of Eastern Ontario’s (CHEO) challenge to patents on genes related to Long QT 
syndrome was settled. The settlement provided a licence to CHEO to test for the 
syndrome.  A primary driver of the litigation in all three jurisdictions, was the broader 
ethical issues posed by such patents, including, the potential healthcare implications of 
such patents. The European Union adopted tailored legislation to deal with biotechnology 
patents in 1998, including gene patents. Again, in Europe, a primary concern underlying 
the drafting of the Directive was the ethical issues posed by biotechnological patents.4   
 
Nonetheless, despite ethical issues driving challenges to, and debates on changes of 
patent law in such contexts, in practice ethical issues are given limited consideration 
within patent law cases in each of these jurisdictions. Using gene patents as a case 
study, this article argues patent law in these jurisdictions, has failed to engage with the 
broader ethical issues (including potential healthcare implications) of biotechnological 
patents in any meaningful way. In effect, a marginalisation of ethical issues is evident 
within patent law. The only exception to this is Canada, where solutions outside patent 
law, via licensing, have been devised to deliver access to technologies under patent, 
focusing on the public health issues at stake.  
 
The article argues that unless and until we adopt fundamental institutional change within 
patent law to address broader ethical issues inherent in the grant of patents, it behoves 
us to take seriously and devise appropriately, solutions outside patent law to address 
such ethical issues including potential healthcare implications posed by patent use. For 
such reasons, at a practical level, the solution offered by tailored licensing approaches 
in the Canadian context, although not without some potential shortcomings, is arguably 
a preferable solution in the short term. Such licensing approaches should be taken 
seriously in other jurisdictions.  
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In 2013 and 2015, the Supreme Court of the United States (US)5 and Australian High 
Court,6 respectively, rejected the patentability of isolated genes.7 Subsequently, in 
March 2016 a case filed in the Federal Court of Canada involving the Children’s 
Hospital of Eastern Ontario’s (CHEO) challenge to patents on genes related to Long 
QT syndrome (a condition involving irregular heart rhythms) was settled. The 
settlement provided a licence to CHEO to test for the syndrome.8  A primary driver of 
the litigation in all three jurisdictions, was the broader ethical issues posed by such 
patents, including, specifically the potential healthcare implications of such patents. The 
European Union adopted tailored legislation to deal with biotechnology patents in 1998, 
including gene patents. Again, a primary concern underlying the drafting of the Directive 
was the ethical issues, including healthcare implications, posed by biotechnological 
patents.9  
 
However, despite ethical issues driving challenges to and debates on changes of patent 
law, in practice ethical issues are given limited consideration within patent law cases in 
each jurisdiction. To demonstrate this marginalisation of ethical issues, including 
healthcare implications, posed by patents, this article uses gene patents as a case study 
focusing on approaches adopted in Europe,10 Australia and the US, and Canada. These 
jurisdictions were chosen as they offer examples of three differing legal approaches to 
gene patentability, namely: a tailored legislative approach to biotechnological patents, 
including gene patentability (EU); jurisdictions with no tailored legislative approach where 
questions on patentability are decided by judicial interpretation (United States and 
Australia); and an approach using tailored licensing agreements between patent holders 
and public hospitals (Canada). Through these case studies, the article demonstrates that 
despite differences in the legal approaches adopted to gene patenting a marginalisation 
of ethical issues is evident in all contexts within patent law, the only exception being 
Canada where a solution to address the public health issues is devised outside of patent 
law through a contractual licensing approach. This in turn implies that the marginalisation 
of ethical issues is a broader feature of the interpretative framework of patent law.11 
 
These arguments have important practical significance. They demonstrate that in the 
absence of institutional change within patent law to give greater teeth to ethical 
                                                          
5 Association for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics Inc. (2013) 569 U.S. 576. 
6 D'Arcy v Myriad Genetics Inc. [2015] HCA 35. 
7 These are genes which have been isolated or removed from the human body. 
8 This was a challenged by Children’s Hospital of Eastern Ontario against Transgenomic. For further details, see 
http://www.cheo.on.ca/en/challenge-gene-patents 
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Institutional Examination of the Implications of the Unitary Patent Package for the Morality Provisions: A 
Fragmented future too Far?” (2017) 48(1) International Review of Intellectual Property and Competition Law, 
42-70. 
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Peter Drahos, “Biotechnology Patents, Markets and Morality” (1999) 21(9) European Intellectual Property 
Review 441, 441-442. 




provisions law to exclude or limit patents, solutions outside of patent law, such as via 
licensing, are needed to address ethical issues, including the potential healthcare 
implications of patents. Such approaches are likely to be a quicker and more cost-
effective mechanism to address healthcare implications than solutions within patent law. 
There are two elements to this argument. First, the article demonstrates there is a 
marginalisation of ethical issues within patent law, due primarily to either a failure to 
engage with such issues or because when such issues are raised often via provisions 
allowing for exclusions from patentability,12 the judicial bodies/quasi-judicial bodies 
interpreting such exclusions tend to do so in a narrow technical manner which water 
down the effects of exclusions. Second, to compound this, the article demonstrates that 
it is likely to be difficult to bring successful patent challenges in such contexts, given the 
asymmetry between those who hold patents on genes (typically large companies) and 
those who may be affected by such patents (such as individual patients and hospitals), 
in terms of their resources and capacity to take and sustain legal action. This asymmetry 
reduces the likelihood of patents being successfully challenged even where there are 
potential healthcare implications. Shedding light on such issues suggests that once 
granted, patentability is likely to be maintained, because challenges are likely to be rare 
and even when taken likely to be unsuccessful in addressing broader ethical issues. 
Hence, it is argued that solutions outside patent law are a more effective means to 
achieve health related goals in the short term.  
 
Importantly, in making such arguments, the article is not suggesting that patent law 
should not engage with ethical issues, instead, it is demonstrating how it currently does 
not do so, using gene patents as a case-study. For it to do so effectively, a fundamental 
institutional change would be needed within patent law in the way patent criteria and 
exclusions from patentability are interpreted. This is unlikely to be achieved in the short 
term, given that it would require a bottom up change to patent law, to fundamentally 
reconfigure how exclusions against patentability are applied in practice.13 Hence, 
particularly in cases of health-related biotechnologies, where potential risks to health 
and/or life are posed by patents, solutions outside patent law are needed. 
 
Furthermore, the ethical issues posed by gene patents and other biotechnologies from a 
healthcare perspective, can be distinguished from debates around patents and 
medicines. Whilst patents pose healthcare implications in both contexts, the concerns 
are heightened and arguably, of a different order in the gene patent sphere. Within gene 
patenting, the patent relates directly to an element, albeit isolated, from the human body. 
The potential for using such patents to limit genetic testing and isolation of a gene, also 
directly impacts on what samples can be taken from the body, and on what tests can be 
performed on samples taken from the human body. In other words, gene patents can be 
used to place limits on what can be done with biological specimens, and hence can be 
seen as a broader interference with human autonomy or bodily integrity. 
 
                                                          
12 For example, in the European context, Art 53, EPC which provides for listed exceptions from patentability. 
13 See discussion in: Aisling McMahon, The Morality Provisions in the European Patent System: An Institutional 
Examination (PhD Thesis, University of Edinburgh 2016) which argued that a presumption favouring patentability 
is evident within European patent law. The EPO has expressed reluctance to engage with ethical issues or refuse 
patents on the basis of the morality provisions unless such inventions are considered abhorrent. For a discussion 
of presumption of patentability in the US context, see Margo Bagley, “Patent First, Ask Questions Later: Morality 
and Biotechnology in Patent Law” (2004) 45(2) William and Mary Law Review 469. 




These arguments are novel for three reasons: First, it is the first article to compare the 
judicial interpretative approaches (US and Australia), legislative approaches (Europe) 
and licensing avenues (Canada) related to gene patents. In doing so, it demonstrates 
the pervasive marginalisation of ethical issues within patent law for gene patents which 
is not confined to any one jurisdiction or legal approach. Second, and relatedly, although 
European law at first glance may appear more responsive to ethical issues due to the 
ethical provisions within the text of the Biotechnology Directive, the article illustrates that 
such ethical provisions have limited teeth in practice. They tend to be interpreted by the 
Boards of the European Patent Office in a narrow technical manner. Thirdly, it sheds light 
on some of the difficulties in challenging patents in such contexts making a case for why 
solutions outside patent law are needed.  
 
In making these arguments, the paper is structured as follows: Part I sets the foundation 
for the analysis by providing a brief overview of what gene patents are, and the main 
ethical and legal objections raised against gene patents. Part II then examines the three 
legal approaches to gene patentability demonstrating the gap between the rationales 
driving such legal challenges to gene patents (based primarily on health-related 
objections), and the way these challenges are framed within patent law adjudication 
(focusing on narrow application of patent criteria). It highlights the Canadian approach 
as the only one which directly engages with the potential healthcare implications. 
  
Part III then demonstrates why solutions outside patent law such as licensing 
agreements are needed by illuminating some of the main obstacles to mounting 
successful challenges to gene patents. It also highlights the needs for governmental 
intervention if such solutions are to be effective, in order to lend greater strength to 
stakeholders in negotiating such licenses in the healthcare context. Part IV concludes 
arguing that the current marginalisation of ethics within patent law, compounded by the 
obstacles for challenging patents needs urgent re-consideration. Such issues are only 
likely to be exacerbated as biotechnologies and areas such as personalised medicines 
continue to develop.  
 
  
Part I: Gene Patents: The Legal and Ethical Objections 
‘Gene patent’ is a general term which can include several types of inventions.14 It is most 
commonly used to refer to any patent involving a claim over nucleic acids including 
deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) or ribonucleic acid (RNA). Many products can use DNA 
sequences, such as, genetic testing which are diagnostic tests used to identify if a person 
has a genetic variant that may be indicative of a particular disease, or of a higher risk of 
developing a disease.15 For example, certain mutations or changes on the BRCA1 or 
BRCA2 gene, considered below in further detail, can indicate a higher risk of developing 
breast or ovarian cancer. This article focuses primarily on patents related to isolated 
genes, but the arguments raised also have implications for patents on other health-
related biotechnologies. 
                                                          
14 See discussion in Robert Cook-Deegan, “Gene Patents” in Mary Crowley (ed) From Birth to Death and Bench 
to Clinic: The Hastings Center Bioethics Briefing Book for Journalists, Policymakers, and Campaigns (Garrison, 
New York: The Hastings Center, 2008) 69, 69; Robert Cook Deegan and Christopher Heaney, “Patents in 
Genomics and Human Genetics” (2010) 11 Annu Rev Genomics Hum Genet 383. 
15See discussion in: Nuffield Council, The Ethics of Patenting DNA (London, 2002) at 25. 




This section focuses on briefly mapping the main types of objections which have been 
raised to gene patents. It does so in order to set the foundation for Part II, which argues 
that although the main driving objections to gene patents often focuses on the ethical 
implications, and particularly, the healthcare implications of such patents, however, gene 
patent challenges tend to focus instead on the objections based on technical patent 
criteria. For this reason, the arguments in favour of gene patents, which tend to focus 
primarily on the (albeit contested) need for patents to incentivise innovation in this 
context, are beyond the scope of this analysis, but have been examined in detail 
elsewhere.16 
Objections against gene patents can be divided into three main categories. The first 
category are objections are raised against the consequences for healthcare and 
research. Patents allow the patent holder to exclude others from using the invention, 
unless they have the express permission (usually via a licence on the patented 
technology) from the patent holder. Therefore, granting a patent gives control over the 
invention to the patent holder, and a potential monopoly over the use of an invention. 
This creates five main issues for healthcare and research.  
Firstly, gene patents can influence the price of products containing isolated genes, such 
as genetic tests which has potential implications for access to genetic testing. If the 
patent holder refuses to license the invention or only licences for a high cost, this has the 
potential to reduce competition in an area and in turn to drive up the price of an invention. 
For example, in the United States, Myriad Genetics Inc. (hereafter Myriad) held patents 
on isolated BRCA1 and BRCA2 genes – as noted mutations on these genes indicate a 
higher risk of breast and ovarian cancers17 - to become the sole provider of BRCA1/2 
testing in the US. Prior to the recent US decision in Myriad which rejected the patentability 
of isolated genes in the US, including Myriad’s patents on BRCA1 and BRCA2, it was 
reported that BRCA1 and BRCA2 tests cost approximately $2,200, whereas after the 
ruling a competitor company DNATraits announced the availability of competing BRCA 
tests at $995.18 This example is returned to in Part II below. It is conceded that pricing 
issues are complex and other factors aside from patenting contribute to the pricing of 
genetic testing.19 However, patents are at the very least a contributory influence as they 
                                                          
16 For example, for a discussion on the gene patent incentives, and critiques in this context, see: Daniel K. 
Yarbrough, “After Myriad: Reconsidering the Incentives for Innovation in the Biotech Industry” (2014) 21 
Michigan Telecommunications  & Technology Law Review 141. 
17 The overall lifetime risk of developing breast or ovarian cancers is between 2.7 and 6.4 times greater for those 
with mutations on BRCA1 and BRCA2 in comparison to other women. See Robert Cook Deegan, “Impact of 
Gene Patents and Licensing Practices on Access to Genetic Testing for Inherited Susceptibility to Cancer: 
Comparing Breast and Ovarian Cancers to Colon Cancers” (2014) 12(4) Genetic Medicine 15-38. A recent study 
estimated that in the general population approximately 12% of women will develop breast cancer, in contrast 
around “72% of women who inherit a harmful BRCA1 mutation and about 69% of women who inherit a harmful 
BRCA2 mutation will develop breast cancer by the age of 80”. There is also a higher risk of ovarian cancers, 1.3% 
risk in the general population for women to contract ovarian cancer in their lifetime, compared to “44% of women 
who inherit a harmful BRCA1 mutation and about 17% of women who inherit a harmful BRCA2 mutation will 
develop ovarian cancer by the age of 80.”  See KB Kuchenbaecker, JL Hopper, DR Barnes et al, “Risks of breast, 
ovarian, and contralateral breast cancer for BRCA1 and BRCA2 mutation carriers” (2017) 317(23) JAMA 2402. 
18 Robert Cook Deegan and Anne Niehaus, “After Myriad: Genetic Testing in the Wake of Recent Supreme Court 
Decisions about Gene Patents” (2014) 2(4) Curr Genet Med Rep. 223, Table 1. 
19 See, discussion of other factors in Naomi Hawkins, “A red herring – Invalidity of human gene sequence patents” 
(2016) 38(2) European Intellectual Property Review 83, who cites the following: A Colaianni, S Chandrasekharan 
and R Cook-Deegan, “Impact of Gene Patents and Licensing Practices on Access to Genetic Testing and Carrier 




allow the patent holder to exclude others from using an invention. Hence, patents have 
the potential to be used to limit competition of providers creating a monopoly of provision.  
Secondly, if there is only one provider of genetic testing - for example, if the patent holder 
refuses to license the technology – then there could be shortages in the availability of 
testing.20 This could result in longer waiting times for instance for diagnostic screening if 
only one provider is licenced to perform this, or delays if the material must be sent away 
to the genetic test provider for screening.  
Thirdly, there may also be potential issues with the quality of an invention.21 However, 
one argument is that if there are no competitors or a reduction in competitors providing 
testing,22 there will be no rivals to provide genetic testing and hence limited scope for the 
market to ensure the best quality tests are being offered.   
Fourthly, if an individual or healthcare practitioner is not satisfied with the test, if the 
patent is being enforced strictly, there may be only one test provider, and in such cases 
there will be no option to get a second opinion on a diagnostic test from an alternative 
provider.23 Fifthly, gene patents have the potential to hamper or restrict research if 
researchers divert attention away from working on patented inventions due to the fear of 
patent infringement claims.24 Tests may not be developed further, if competitors fear 
patent infringement litigation. These issues are the core, often-cited, ‘health-related’ 
implications of gene patents as denoted in this article; however, this is not an exhaustive 
list. 
Turning back to the core objections to gene patents, a second category of objection is 
based on the special status of DNA which claims DNA is special in nature and should 
not be patented. This argument can be extended to the idea that patenting is a form of 
commodification of the body which should be prohibited. Such arguments are 
encompassed by the ‘No Patents on Life’ slogans used in protesting against patents on 
biotechnology.25 Relatedly, it has been argued that the human genome should be part 
of the ‘common heritage of mankind’ and should not be subject to patent protection.26  
                                                          
Screening for Tay-Sachs and Canavan Disease” (2010) 12 Genetics in Medicine S5; Secretary’s Advisory Committee 
on Genetics Health and Society, “Gene Patents and Licensing Practices and Their Impact on Patient Access to Genetic 
Tests” (2010). 
20 Naomi Hawkins, “A red herring – Invalidity of human gene sequence patents” (2016) 38(2) European 
Intellectual Property Review 83. 
21 Such issues are contested, see discussion in Hawkins, ibid. 
22 This was raised by the plaintiffs at District Court level in Association for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad 
Genetics Inc. 569 U.S. 576 (2013). 
23 Naomi Hawkins, “A red herring: invalidity of human gene sequence patents” (2016) 38(2) European Intellectual 
Property Law Review 83 who notes this as being a concern cited in the context of Myriad’s patents on BRCA1/BRCA2 
and for patients whose test results suggested there was a variant of uncertain significance. Secretary’s Advisory 
Committee on Genetics Health and Society, “Gene Patents and Licensing Practices and Their Impact on Patient 
Access to Genetic Tests” (2010). 
24 Naomi Hawkins, “A red herring: invalidity of human gene sequence patents” (2016) 38(2) European Intellectual 
Property Law Review 83-91 raises some interesting counter-arguments to the above concerns. 
25See Nicholas Hildyard, & Sarah Sexton, “No Patents on Life” (2000) 15(1) Forum for Applied Research and 
Public Policy; Knoxville 75-79; Rogeer Hoedemaekers, “Commercialization, Patents and Moral Assessment of 
Biotechnology Products” (2001) 26(3) Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 273; G Dutfield, Intellectual Property 
Rights and the Life Science Industries: A Twentieth Century History (Taylor and Francis 2003) chapter 6. 
26Bartha Maria Knoppers, “Status, sale and patenting of human genetic material: An international survey” (1999) 
22 Nature Genetics 23-25; M.L. Sturges, “Who should hold property rights to the human genome? An application 




Thirdly, objections are based on whether isolated genes meet or fit within with technical 
patentability criteria.27Inventions must fulfil three basic criteria to be patentable - they 
must demonstrate: novelty, inventive step and industrial applicability.28 Arguments 
against gene patents under this category have tended to focus on three aspects: 1) 
Genes, even when isolated, are naturally occurring substances and thus, patent 
ineligible subject-matter. The argument is that genes are discoveries or products of 
nature, rather than technical man-made creations or inventions. A discovery is an 
acquisition of knowledge about an existing fact whereas an invention is something that 
someone creates or develops which did not previously exist. Therefore, some argue that 
genes which exist in our bodies (and so in the world) are natural substances and not an 
invention. 2) Relatedly, it is questioned whether identifying and isolating a gene, and/or 
its function, is sufficiently novel to warrant patent protection. The genes are not created 
as a new substance, even isolated genes mirror what already exists in the human body. 
3) Arguments can be raised around whether isolated genes fulfil the inventive step 
criteria according to which inventions should be non-obvious to the person skilled in the 
art. For instance, several teams of researchers may be working separately on a particular 
scientific development at the same time, for example to sequence and locate a gene, or 
to develop a similar technology.29 In such circumstances, if multiple teams are working 
on the same thing, often using similar techniques, can this truly be said that this was an 
inventive or non-obvious development?30 
 
Part II: Differing Legal Approaches & Common Marginalisation of Healthcare 
Implications 
 
Turning to the legal approaches to gene patents, this section demonstrates a chasm 
between the primary objections tending to drive and underpin legal challenges to gene 
patents (which often relate to the potential healthcare implications of patents) and the 
focus within such patent law challenges, both in the courts and patent offices, where a 
marginalisation of ethical issues is evident, and where cases instead, focus on narrow 
technical patentability criteria. The only exception is the Canadian public health licensing 
approach, which is tailored specifically towards public health issues, and is a solution 
devised outside patent law. 
                                                          
of the common heritage of humankind” (2017) 13 Am. Univ. Intl Law Rev. 219; Lori B Andrews, “Genes and 
patent policy: rethinking intellectual property rights” (2002) Nature Genetics 803; Jasper A Bovenberg, “Mining 
the Common Heritage of our DNA: Lessons Learned from Grotius and Pardo” (2006) 8 Duke Law and Technology 
Review 1. 
27 See discussion in Naomi Hawkins, “Human Gene Patents and Genetic Testing in Europe: A Reappraisal” (2010) 
7(3) SCRIPTed 453, 455. 
28 Art 52-57 EPC in Europe. The terminology differs on the criteria across jurisdictions. However, this is also the 
terminology used in the TRIPS Agreement, Article 27. 
29 The CRISPR-Cas9 patent litigation provides a recent example of this, see the discussion of the race to patent 
in: Arti K. Rai & Robert Cook-Deegan, “Racing for academic glory and patents: Lessons from CRISPR” (2017) 
Science 874. 
30 For a discussion of the scientific race to isolate BRCA1 see: Mary Claire King, “The race to clone BRCA1” 
(2014) 343(6178) Science 1462; Mark Skolnick, “Winning the race to find BRCA1” (Interview, DNA Learning 
Center) https://www.dnalc.org/view/15246-Winning-the-race-to-find-BRCA1-Mark-Skolnick.html 




(a) Judicial Challenges to Gene Patents 
Patents on isolated genes, specifically related to BRCA1 and BRCA2, were successfully 
challenged in 2013 in the United States in Association for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad 
Genetics Inc,31 and in October 2015 in Australia in D’Arcy v. Myriad Genetics Inc.32 Both 
cases demonstrate a similar pattern where health-related objections against gene 
patents formed the impetus for challenges, however, when the cases were litigated the 
focus shifted to objections based on narrow patentability criteria. There was no 
engagement by the courts in either jurisdiction with the underlying healthcare issues 
posed by the patents.  The section analyses both contexts and reflects on the 
implications of these cases.   
At the outset, it is conceded that courts are confined by the legal arguments presented 
to them. However, the healthcare implications were expressly referenced in plaintiff 
statements in the US District Court context of Myriad case leaving scope for the court to 
engage further with these. Instead, they were dismissed at District Court stage with 
limited analysis by the court, which merely stated they were issues of factual dispute 
which could not be resolved by the court.33  Arguably, even if the court found it could not 
engage directly with such issues, given that the potential healthcare implications of such 
patents were a central driver of such cases, obiter comments could have been made on 
the patents potential for health-implications. It is also accepted that legal teams will 
present their strongest arguments in litigation and the analysis which follows is not a 
criticism of the choice of focus on patentability criteria per se. Instead, this very focus on 
patentability criteria to challenge such patents demonstrates the perceived limited scope 
for ethical considerations within patent law. By highlighting the gap between the ethical 
objections driving such challenges and the way arguments are framed within the case 
law as issues involving narrow technical patentability criteria, the article aims to highlight 
the disjoint between patent law and health contexts. It demonstrates the disconnected 
nature of patent law and calls for a deeper consideration of this disconnect. 
(i) United States: Association for Molecular Pathology v Myriad Genetics 
On 13th June 2013, Justice Thomas delivered the Supreme Court judgment in the Myriad 
case which found “naturally occurring DNA segment is a product of nature and not patent 
eligible merely because it has been isolated, but that cDNA is patent eligible because it 
is not naturally occurring”.34 The case was originally brought by twenty plaintiffs35 -
including medical doctors, patient groups, individual patients, professional medical 
associations, and scientists - whose objections to gene patents were based primarily 
around concerns related to the potential healthcare implications of gene patents, 
                                                          
31 (2013) 569 U.S. 576. 
32 [2015] HCA 35. 
33Association for Molecular Pathology v USPTO (2010) 702 F.Supp.2d at 207 Justice Sweetman stated: “Whether 
the patents at issue impact the testing for BRCA1/2 mutations favorably or unfavorably is an issue of factual 
dispute not resolvable in the context of the instant motions.” 
34 569 U.S. 576 (2013), 1. 
35 The original plaintiffs in the District Court case were: Association for Molecular Pathology; American College 
of Medical Genetics; American Society for Clinical Pathology; College of American Pathologists; Haig Kazazian; 
Arupa Ganguly; Wendy Chung; Harry Ostrer; David Ledbetter; Stephen Warren; Ellen Matloff; Elsa Reich; 
Breast cancer Action; Boston’s Women’s Health Book Collective; Lisbeth Ceriani; Runi Limary, Genae Girard; 
Patrice Fortune; Vicky Thomason; Kathleen Raker. 




including issues of access to genetic testing, the quality of the testing, the availability of 
second medical opinions, and the potential restrictions on research as a result of the 
patents.36 
The Court’s finding that isolated genes were not patentable was significant because it 
meant Myriad’s patents on BRCA1 and BRCA2 were no longer valid.37 Importantly, if 
Myriad’s claims were upheld as valid by the Court the patents would have given Myriad 
an exclusive right to isolate BRCA1 and BRCA2 DNA in the US,38 for the duration of the 
patents. This would have had significant healthcare implications because isolation of the 
BRCA1 and BRCA2 genes is needed to conduct genetic testing,39 and prior to the US 
Supreme Court decision, Myriad had used its patent to issue cease and desist letters to 
other laboratories providing genetic testing on BRCA1 and BRCA2, claiming patent 
infringement because testing involved the isolation of these genes.40 Accordingly, such 
laboratories ceased the testing and this enabled Myriad to solidify its role as the only 
BRCA testing provider in the US.41 Importantly, if the patents were valid, this would have 
set a precedent for other patent holders to enforce patents on isolated DNA in other 
contexts, and potentially to use patents in a similar manner for other genes, and genetic 
testing.  
However, when one examines the Supreme Court’s reasoning, the decision’s effect is 
more limited than it may initially seem. This is because the Court’s reasoning for finding 
patents on isolated DNA invalid, was based on narrow technical grounds rather than 
based on broader ethical concerns, including the healthcare implications of such patents. 
This is significant because it limits the application of the case for future technologies.  
In assessing validity of the patent, the Court focused on s. 101 of the Patents Act, the 
operable provision in the US patent law. This states that: 
“Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful…composition of matter, or 
any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to 
the conditions and requirements of this title.” 
The Court stated that an exception to this principle is that “laws of nature, natural 
phenomena and abstract ideas are not patentable”, and the reason for this exclusion is 
that patent “[p]rotection strikes a delicate balance between creating “incentives that lead 
to creation, invention and discovery” and “imped[ing] the flow of information that might 
permit, indeed spur, invention”.42 This was the closest the Supreme Court came to 
alluding to the underlying ethical issues involved in gene patenting, and even here the 
discussion of ‘impeding the flow of information’ is framed around the innovation context, 
not around the potential implications for health or research. This lack of reference to 
broader ethical issues is disappointing given the origins of the challenge. Moreover, 
                                                          
36The plaintiff statements are available at https://www.aclu.org/other/brca-plaintiff-statements?redirect=free-
speech_womens-rights/brca-plaintiff-statements#warren  
37 569 U.S. 576 (2013), See discussion of claims p. 5-6. 
38 Ibid, 6, C. 
39 Ibid, 7. 
40 Ibid, 7. 
41 Ibid, 7. 
42Ibid, 11. 




nowhere in the Supreme Court judgment did it directly highlight the healthcare 
implications of gene patents.  
The Court found that Myriad’s “principal contribution was uncovering the precise location 
and genetic sequence of the BRCA1 and BRCA2 genes”.43 However, in doing so, Myriad 
did not create anything,44 instead, it “found an important and useful gene, but separating 
that gene from its surrounding genetic material is not an act of invention.”45 In the Court’s 
view “[g]round-breaking, innovative or even brilliant discovery does not by itself satisfy 
the s. 101 inquiry.”46 Accordingly, although Myriad located the BRCA1 and BRCA2 genes 
this discovery did not mean the BRCA genes were a new composition of matter  required 
for patentability under s.101.47 Instead, the value in Myriad’s patent claim was in the 
Court’s view the information contained within the genes not with the “specific chemical 
composition of a particular molecule.”48 Thus, isolated genes were not patent eligible.  
A technical distinction was also drawn by the Court relating to cDNA (an exons only 
molecule that is not naturally occurring),49 which it held was patentable because it differs 
from the DNA molecule itself and is therefore not “a “product of nature”.50 The Court did 
not give guidance on how to define whether something is ‘naturally occurring’ or not, and 
this could also create uncertainty in the context of future patent challenges.51  
In short, the decision focused primarily on whether a substance is a ‘product of nature’ 
or ‘man made’ to determine patentability and this will be the key question asked in future 
cases concerning similar patents. The finding that isolated genes are not patentable had 
positive implications for genetic testing in the US. However, the decision does not have 
direct implications for patents on other biotechnologies which pose similar healthcare 
implications given that such healthcare implications were not material to the court’s 
decision. Thus, should similar healthcare implications arise in the context of patents 
related to other types of future biotechnologies which are not isolated genes, further 
litigation would be required – which is both costly and time consuming. Technologies 
have already significantly developed since the filing of the Myriad patents, but given the 
narrow grounds of the reasoning it is confined to isolated genes, and does not have 
broader implications for more recent technologies such as, for example, CRISPR 
techniques which have the potential to modify human genes and could also have 
healthcare implications. Hence, the benefits of the case do not have the breadth or 
potential longevity, they might have had were the court to engage directly with the 
underlying healthcare and broader ethical implications of such patents.  
(ii) Australia: D’Arcy v Myriad Genetics Inc 






48 Ibid, 15. 
49Ibid, 16, section C.  
50 Ibid, 17. 
51 Jessica C. Lai, “Myriad Genetics and the BRCA Patents in Europe: The Implications of the U.S. Supreme Court 
Decision” (2015) 5 U.C. Irvine L. Rev. 1041. 




A similar challenge was brought in Australia against Myriad’s patents on the BRCA1 
gene by Yvonne D’Arcy. Ms D’Arcy was a breast cancer survivor and stated that she 
wished to challenge Myriad’s patent in order to ensure that women would not be denied 
access to genetic testing as a result of the patents. She stated that she had ‘"met a lot of 
women with genetic cancer and if I can help them in any way stop having to have chemo 
and radiation therapy then I will have done my job."52 It must be noted, that although 
Myriad had patents over BRCA1 in Australia, unlike in the US context, it did not enforce 
these patents as aggressively there.53  
In 2010, Ms D’Arcy’s case commenced,54 the challenge failed in both the Federal Court 
and Full Federal Court stages, but she was successful in the Australian High Court. 
However, like the US, the case and Australian High Court’s reasoning is framed entirely 
around technical patent criteria with no reference to the broader healthcare context. 
The High Court was asked to consider whether the isolated gene was patentable within 
s. 18(1)(a) of the Patents Act 1990. Section 18(1)(a) states that a patentable invention is 
one which is a: “manner of manufacture within the meaning of section 6 of the Statute of 
Monopolies”.55 The court found that DNA was not a manner of manufacture and hence 
unpatentable subject matter. According to the court, to be patentable an invention must 
be created by human action, and isolated DNA is not created by human action. The court 
stated that the core substance of the claimed invention is the “information embodies in 
arrangements of nucleotides” and such information is “not “made” by human action” 
instead it is discerned.56 Hence, it was not patentable subject matter. 
Similarly, to the US context, the court made no reference to the health-related issues that 
motivated Ms D’Arcy to challenge the patent. Its only comment on the broader 
implications of such patents, was to say that if the patent was granted it:  
                                                          
52Tracey Bowden, “Brisbane grandmother in legal battle against US biotech company Myriad Genetics over 
human gene ownership” (ABC News, 16 June 2015) available at https://www.abc.net.au/news/2015-06-
16/grandmother-sues-biotech-company-over-gene-ownership/6550600  
53Instead, Myriad granted an exclusive licence to Genetic Technologies for these patents in Australia – see Reema 
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“…raises the risk of a chilling effect upon legitimate innovative activity outside the 
formal boundaries of the monopoly and risks creating a penumbral de facto 
monopoly impeding the activities of legitimate improvers and inventors.”57  
This offers a recognition of a potential chilling effect of the patent on other technologies 
or improvement of these but again it is framed in terms of innovation, and fails to question 
or engage with the potential implications for human health. 
(iii) Interim Reflections: Judicial approaches and marginalisation of healthcare 
implications 
The US and Australia decisions in Myriad display no engagement with the potential 
healthcare implications of patents on isolated genes, despite this being the primary 
motivating factor for the individuals challenging such patents.58 As noted, it is conceded 
that courts are confined by arguments put to them and this may explain why this was not 
their core focus. However, this is also problematic, as the fact that such legal arguments, 
were premised on technical narrow patent criteria suggests these were deemed the 
strongest arguments by legal teams to put forward. This article is not questioning whether 
this is the case, rather it argues that this focus on narrow technical criteria demonstrates 
the gap between the core underlying issues at stake i.e. the potential healthcare 
implications of such patents, and how patent law frames such issues. In effect, patent 
law is not engaging with the underlying objections to such patents. Rather, the court in 
each case when arguments are framed within patent law terms, treats the claimed 
invention, the isolated gene, as fungible or interchangeable with any other inventions, 
which in turn leads to a lack of engagement with the broader issues such as the effects 
of patents on health and human life.59Once an invention is deemed patentable, the 
content of that particular invention, and the ramifications of patentability stemming from 
what the object of the invention is, is not questioned. Moving patent law beyond this, 
arguably blinkered view, although not impossible, would require a serious re-calibration 
of patent law. This would include a fundamental institutional shift in patent law towards 
examining whether the nature of the invention should be considered in terms of how the 
patent is used, for example, if healthcare implications at stake.  
This is not a trivial point, because deciding such cases on narrow patent criteria rather 
than broader public-health reasons has significant implications as it reduces the potential 
impact of these decisions. In both the US and Australia, isolated genes are no longer 
patentable, but as noted, such findings do not have broader application for future 
patented biotechnologies which pose similar healthcare implications but are not isolated 
genes. Instead, such future inventions would need to be fully litigated. This takes 
considerable time and financial resources and this in turn helps to perpetuate the 
presumption of patentability in such cases, a point returned to in part III.  
(b) Tailored Legislative Approach: Europe 
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Moreover, a marginalisation of ethical issues is not confined to where there is no tailored 
legislation dealing with patents and biotechnology. Instead, the European context shows, 
that even where there are tailored legislative provisions which have the potential to limit 
patents based on ethical issues, much will depend on how these provisions are 
interpreted within patent law and what teeth, if any, they are given to such provisions by 
patent offices or courts who apply them. To date, European patent law has shown strong 
reluctance to engage with the healthcare implications of inventions through such 
provisions. Instead, as in other jurisdictions, a disjoint is evident between the concerns 
as framed within patent law, and the underlying objections motivating legal challenges to 
gene patents. This lends further weight to the disjoint evident between patent law and 
health, as even where laws are drafted in a way which takes account of ethical issues, 
such provisions appear to be interpreted within patent law in narrow technical manner 
which waters down their potential effect. 
Briefly, by way of background, within Europe, the European Patent Convention 1973 
(EPC) applies to 38 States including all EU states. Patent grant is assessed either at a 
national level in each jurisdiction, or applicants can apply to the European Patent Office 
(EPO) for a patent in multiple EPC States. If the EPO grants this application, it will give 
the applicant a bundle of national patents, applicable in the States where the patents 
were applied for. The EU adopted the Biotechnology Directive 1998 (hereafter the 
Directive) to deal specifically with the patentability of biotechnological inventions. The 
Directive was subsequently adopted as supplementary interpretation for the EPC, and 
the implementing provisions to the EPC were updated to include provisions from the 
Directive.60  
The Directive’s main purpose was to clarify the patentability of biotechnological 
inventions,61 its drafting involved over ten years of debate. Much of the debate focused 
on the ethical issues posed by biotechnological patents,62 and the Directive was only 
adopted following its amendment to include specific provisions dealing with the ethical 
issues.63 Hence, the European approach at least on paper is underpinned by an 
emphasis on addressing ethical issues posed by biotechnological patents. However, 
in practice, the provisions contained therein are interpreted in a technical manner 
demonstrated by the gene patentability context. 
For instance, Article 5 of the Directive states that: 
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‘The human body, at the various stages of its formation and development, and 
the simple discovery of one of its elements, including the sequence or partial 
sequence of a gene, cannot constitute patentable inventions.’ 
Based on this provision alone one might think isolated genes as parts of the human body 
would not be patentable. However, its effect is watered down by Art 5(2) which states: 
 “An element isolated from the human body or otherwise produced by means of a 
technical process, including the sequence or partial sequence of a gene, may 
constitute a patentable invention, even if the structure of that element is identical 
to that of a natural element.  
Art 5(2) of the Directive is an express acknowledgment that isolated genes may be 
patentable. It is mirrored in the EPC where, although Article 52 of the EPC provides that 
“mere discoveries are unpatentable”, the EPO Guidelines for Examination64 provide that 
a substance found in nature may be patentable if it can be shown to produce a technical 
effect and gives gene patents as a specific example. Limitations have been placed on 
this provision, for example to be patentable, one must disclose the function of the gene 
in the patent application.65 However, this requirement of disclosure of function has also 
been eroded in some European States.66 
Moreover, and more troubling, a similar watering down is evident in relation to potential 
exclusions against patentability in Europe. Three main exclusions could in theory be 
applied to limit gene patents, but all of these have been interpreted by the EPO in a way 
which limits their potential effect on gene patents.  
First, under Art 53(c) EPC patents are not available on methods for treatment of the 
human body or diagnostic methods.67 However, this exclusion for treatment methods 
has been interpreted as only for those practiced on or in the human body, and would not 
exclude the isolation of a gene from the body, because the treatment of fluids removed 
from the body is not excluded.68 Moreover, the diagnostic methods exclusion only applies 
to methods practiced on or in the human body, and not to methods performed outside 
the body such as the analysis of blood or biological material which genetic testing 
involves. The exclusion been further watered down by the Diagnostic methods case,69 
where the EPO stated that to fall within the exclusion the invention would need to involve 
all four stages of diagnosis, namely, examination, comparison, identification and the 
diagnosis stage. In other words, patents are only excluded for inventions which make it 
“immediately possible to decide on a particular course of medical treatment.”70 As Bently 
and Sherman, acknowledge, this interpretation means that only an invention leading to 
a complete diagnosis would fall within the exclusion. This waters down any limiting effect 
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on patents related to genetic testing which the provision may otherwise have had. 
Indeed, as they also acknowledge the interpretation may ‘reopen concerns about the 
negative impact that patent law has upon health care and delivery”.71  
Second, the European system provides that patents shall not be granted on inventions 
the commercial exploitation of which are against morality or ordre public.72 This provision 
pre-dated the Biotechnology Directive and was reiterated in Art 6 of the Directive. It was 
invoked to challenge gene patents prior to the Directive in Howard Florey/Relaxin.73 
However, the EPO demonstrated its acute reluctance to engage with the ethical issues, 
stating that whether: 
 “…human genes should be patented is a controversial issue on which many 
persons have strong opinions… [T]he EPO is not the right institution to decide on 
fundamental ethical questions.”  
The EPO Opposition Division (OD) in this case dismissed any claims that patenting of 
a human gene was contrary to the morality provisions with short shrift. One argument 
raised in this context was that patenting genes was akin to patenting a living 
substance, the EPO rejected this with limited substantive analysis of the claim by 
simply stating that ‘DNA as such was not life but one of the chemical entities 
participating in biological processes’.74 It did not provide a justification for why 
patenting of genes amounted to patenting a chemical entity as opposed to living 
substance, nor did it delve into the broader implications of the claim. The OD also 
stated that gene patents did not infringe upon human dignity, and hence did not fall 
foul of the morality provisions in this way. It held that:  
“no offence to human dignity had occurred as the woman who donated tissue 
was asked for her consent and her self-determination was not affected by the 
exploitation of the claimed molecules”.75 
However, this statement looked only at the dignity of the person donating her biological 
sample used to isolate the DNA - in the circumstances of the case - which was then 
subsequently patented. It did not consider the potential impact of gene patents for third 
parties, including the restrictions imposed by gene patents on the isolation of samples 
from third parties, and what could be done with such samples as a result of gene patents. 
Arguably, these issues also amount to interferences with dignity, albeit of third parties, 
as they impact on individuals’ control over their biological specimens, which becomes 
contingent upon whether gene patents are applicable and how these are enforced. Such 
broader interferences with dignity were not alluded to by the OD.76 Moreover, although, 
four main EPO cases involved challenges to the patents owned by Myriad on BRCA1 
and BRCA2, each of these cases, similarly to the Australian and US contexts, focused 
on technical elements of patent law. The patents were narrowed based on novelty or 
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other technical patentability concerns, but not because of broader ethical 
considerations.77 Thus, despite ethical provisions underpinning European patent law, 
there has been limited engagement with the ethical issues posed by gene patents within 
cases involving gene patentability in Europe.  
Third, the experimental use or research exemption exists in Europe which could in theory 
assist those concerned about impacts of gene patents on research. However, its 
interpretation differs across European States, 78 and the exemption is often narrowly 
interpreted.79  
Hence, despite European patent laws sometimes being perceived as more ethically 
grounded or underpinned than other jurisdictions, in practice, the provisions which could 
allow consideration of ethical issues are interpreted with little practical force. Moreover, 
ironically, whilst patents are now not available on isolated genes in the US and Australia, 
the text of the Directive means they continue to be available in Europe. Hence, European 
patent law poses greater potential for negative healthcare implications arising from gene 
patents in this context than the US or Australia. 
On this point, it is conceded that Myriad did not enforce its patents as aggressively in 
Europe as it did in the US. Furthermore, even where patents were applicable there was 
evidence in some countries of ‘wilful blindness’ where the patents were ignored in 
practice.80 Nonetheless, just because patents on genes have not been enforced strongly 
in the past in Europe does not mean they could not be in future – the potential remains 
for these to be interpreted and applied in a way which poses restrictions on healthcare. 
This potential is particularly concerning as we move towards, for example, whole genome 
sequencing or personalised medicine which will require the screening of multiple genes 
which may be under patent.81  
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 (c) Solutions outside Patent Law: Canadian Public Health Licensing Agreement  
Finally, turning to Canada, and specifically the Children’s Hospital of Eastern Ontario 
(CHEO) case where solutions outside of patent law have been devised and provide 
useful lessons in terms of managing potential healthcare implications of gene patents. In 
March 2016, the CHEO’s case which challenged Transgenomic’s patents on genes 
associated with Long QT syndrome,82 was settled. The settlements provided that 
Transgenomic would sign a licence to CHEO to allow it to test for the syndrome.83 Long 
QT syndrome is a rare genetic condition involving a disorder in the heart’s electrical 
activity which can cause irregular heartbeats that may be fatal.84 Testing for the mutation 
on genes associated with the disease is particularly important, given that sometimes the 
first symptom can be sudden adult death.85 In its challenge to these patents, CHEO 
sought: a declaration that processes to diagnose Long QT were not an infringement of 
the patent under s. 60(2) of the Patents Act (PA); a declaration that the isolated nucleic 
acid claims described would be invalid under s. 60(1) PA; and alternatively, a compulsory 
license claiming that the proposed tests constituted a public non-commercial use of the 
Long QT patents under s. 19 PA. 
The CHEO stated that the main impetus for the challenge was that their “physicians and 
scientists felt passionately it was the right thing to do for our patients and families”.86 
Specifically, there were concerns that gene patents reduced “access, innovation and 
affordability”87 of genetic testing. At the time, testing of samples was being conducted in 
the US, and not by CHEO itself due to fears in relation to patent infringement. This meant 
potential delays for the test, increased costs due to having to send samples to the US, 
and a disconnect between the clinical and genetic data of patients.88 Arguably, a further 
issue was that as CHEO was not conducting testing it was not gaining any institutional 
knowledge (such as a database of results, training in conducting the test) which it would 
have gained were testing being performed by it.89 
The main purpose of the settlement was that CHEO could provide genetic testing for 
Long QT genes on a not-for-profit basis specifically to ‘persons entitled to healthcare 
under the Canadian healthcare system, and to carry out not-for-profit patient care and 
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research’.90 Transgenomic offered it a personal, non-exclusive, non-transferable licence 
to Long QT patents, for CHEO to: 
(i) “Undertake or make but not to have undertaken or made Long QT Tests in the 
Territory; 
(ii) To use the Long QT Tests undertaken or manufactured… to 
a. Conduct internal, not-for-profit research concerning Long QT Genes or 
their associated RNS and Polypeptides (provided that, for clarity, such 
research may not be carried out for commercial purposes or carried out on 
behalf of or for the benefit of any third party other than the patient …; 
b. Screen for mutations … 
c. Carry out diagnoses based on the screening 
(iii) Advertise the screening and diagnosis services;”91 
Three main conditions attached to the licence, in terms of what could be provided, 
namely: (i) the tests had to be performed and sold by CHEO at or below cost price;92 (ii) 
screening services provided on research participants or patients could only be provided 
for residents or citizens of Canada, refugees in Canada, or those present in Canada 
other than for the purposes of obtaining medical treatment. This provision limits the 
potential for ‘medical tourism’ i.e. people travelling to Canada specifically to obtain 
cheaper genetic testing for Long QT syndrome. (iii) Tests of Long QT could only be 
provided following a direction or recommendation of a healthcare professional.93 No 
royalty or fee was payable by CHEO for the use of the license.94 
As noted, a further condition of the settlement was that CHEO would discontinue the 
legal proceedings against Transgenomic, and that it would not commence legal 
proceedings challenging the validity or enforceability of Long QT patents or 
Transgenomic’s exclusive ownership of the Long QT patents or assist others in making 
such challenges. If CHEO commenced such legal proceedings or assisted third parties 
to do so, Transgenomic could terminate the licence immediately on giving notice to 
CHEO.95 This clause meant that the challenge against gene patents in Canada had to 
be dropped as a result of their acceptance of the settlement and therefore whether 
isolated genes are patentable in Canada has not been resolved.  
Thus, patents are still technically available on isolated genes in Canada, and there is no 
court decision to say patents on isolated gene are not possible. The CHEO challenge 
arose soon after the two successful challenges in the US and Australia, and although 
each jurisdiction is free to differ on whether genes are patentable, arguably given the 
similar nature of the arguments raised by CHEO to the Myriad cases in the US and 
Australia, and the similar wording of the relevant patent law statutes in Canada, it had a 
good chance of success. Thus, settling the case was of strategic benefit to 
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Transgenomic, as it prevented a definitive answer being given on gene patentability in 
Canada. 
However, on a more pragmatic level, the agreement reached has significant benefits and 
it may be more, or at least as, advantageous than had the case been litigated fully even 
if gene patents were held invalid. Firstly, the settlement resulted in CHEO being able to 
test and screen for Long QT syndrome and genes for Long QT syndrome, which was the 
outcome it had desired. The settlement achieved this outcome without having to engage 
in full litigation of the claim which would have taken considerable time and financial 
resources. Furthermore, although it was arguably a strong case, there is no guarantee it 
would have succeeded. Secondly, the tailored licensing solution has broader benefits 
than might initially be appreciated. Alongside the licence provided between CHEO and 
Transgenomic, a standard licence template was also made available on CHEO’s website 
which could be used by public hospitals and Transgenomic. This could also be rolled out 
for use for other genes, and the statement on CHEO’s website notes that: 
“The deal defines a pathway for all public Canadian hospitals and labs to conduct 
genetic testing without legal roadblocks from gene patents.” 
Arguably, this could also be used for other genes, 96 and equally has potential as a model 
for use for other patentable health-related technologies. This could result in a quicker 
and likely less costly solution to patent issues if similar healthcare implications arise 
related to future technologies, where public healthcare facilities could seek to negotiate 
similar licences with patent holders rather than engaging in full litigation. Thus, unlike the 
narrowly framed judicial approaches in Myriad in the US/Australia which are confined to 
isolated genes, the tailored licensing approach has the potential to have generalisable 
benefits. It also has the potential to achieve public health outcomes in a quicker and more 
cost-effective manner. 
However, the main downside to such licences, is that it is entirely dependent on buy-in 
from the patent holders and for applicants (such as public health hospitals) to seek to 
negotiate these types of licences. Without governmental intervention encouraging or 
incentivising such licensing approaches, it would be up to the patent holder to decide 
whether to agree to such licences and on what terms. Patent holders could place 
onerous burdens on hospitals or others seeking to use patented technology. Moreover, 
much would also depend on the terms of the licences, as for example, patent holders 
could draft them in ways which would allow them to revoke the licence. Furthermore, in 
cases like Long QT which involve rare disease, the reputational damage a patent holder 
might suffer for not agreeing to a licence may be greater than any potential profits it may 
make given the limited number of tests likely to be carried out. However, this may not be 
true for other genes or other patented technologies which may reduce the likelihood of 
patent holders voluntarily agreeing to such licences. Issues might also arise in terms of 
research, as depending on the terms of the licence, if it excluded use for research for 
commercial purposes, this may still restrict research on the patented invention or related 
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Gold, “Gene patents still alive and kicking: their impact on provision of genetic testing for long QT syndrome in 
the Canadian public health-care system” (2017) 19 Genetics in Medicine 1253. 




inventions. This is because if the intention is to produce a follow-on or improved 
healthcare product for commercial market, researchers arguably would fall foul of such 
conditions, or may not wish to risk this. 
Thus, whilst tailored licensing solutions offer potential to address healthcare implications 
of patents, much would depend on how they are drafted and implemented and on their 
uptake by patent holders in other contexts or other jurisdictions. For this reason, to offer 
an effective means to address health-related implications of patents on genes and other 
biotechnologies, a stronger voice or power to negotiate such licences must be given to 
stakeholders such as hospitals and patients likely to be affected by such patents. 97  One 
way to do this, as noted by Khan and Gold is to encourage greater governmental 
intervention in the field. 98 For example, governments could help encourage or where 
needed force patent holders, who are deemed to be unreasonably refusing patent 
licences or charging high prices for these, to engage with licensing similar to the CHEO 
approach within the public health context. This would help shifting the asymmetry of 
power currently evident between patent holders and those affected by patents. As Khan 
and Gold suggest, if patent holders unreasonably failed to negotiate a patent for use of 
the technology for a public health purpose, recourse could be given to applicant to seek 
compulsory licences.99 To give further teeth to such provisions should they be considered 
in other jurisdictions, guidelines could also be provided in how to negotiate licences in 
such context and the circumstances where compulsory licensing would be granted by 
governments outside of Canada if licensing where refused. Standard form licenses 
detailing model terms for use in public health context could also be drafted, as examples 
for use by industry. Arguably, agreeing to voluntary licensing measures may be more 
appealing to patent holders than compulsory licensing as they still leave much control to 
patent holders, and for example, the CHEO model would still allow profit to be made in 
the private health context. Thus, they offer a useful middle ground solution.100 
 
Part III: Moving outside Patent Law: Giving a Voice to Stakeholders 
In terms of why such licensing approaches are likely more effective in the short term to 
addressing the potential healthcare implications posed by patents than legal challenges 
patents, as has been seen, in each jurisdiction, a presumption favouring the narrow 
technical application of patent criteria applies and cases are decided on this, rather than 
on health-related grounds. This means that as technologies develop posing similar 
health-related implications new challenges are needed each time to assess patentability. 
However, alongside the failure of patent law to substantively engage with the healthcare 
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99 This argument is put forward by Sarah Khan and Richard Gold who argue in favour of a role for provincial 
governments in Canada to take the first steps in this context. See Sarah E Khan and Richard Gold, “Contracting 
to counter gene patents – a 21st Century solution to access and innovation” (22 May 2017, Petrie Flom Blog). 
100 See also Naomi Hawkins, “A red herring: invalidity of human gene sequence patents” (2016) 38(2) European 
Intellectual Property Law Review 83 who discusses potential to using licensing as a more nuanced approach to 
denial of patents in such contexts. 




implications of patents, another reason for looking outside patent law for solutions to 
such issues stems from the problems with the current approaches for challenging patents 
which makes successful patent challenges difficult, time consuming, and often unlikely 
to be sustained.  
Three key issues arise in this context. First, patent law is extremely expensive litigation 
to take,101 and can last a considerable amount of time. Notably, all of the judicial 
challenges to gene patents examined in this article, in Canada, United States and 
Australia were led by pro-bono legal teams.102 This level of commitment to challenging 
the healthcare implications of patents is laudable.103  However, it is may be difficult to 
find such groups or individuals who are willing and able to provide their time and skills 
on a pro-bono basis to object to such patents. Moreover, even when a group like this can 
be brought together, a further challenge is whether such groups can match the time and 
financial resources of patent holders, often large corporations with deep financial pockets 
to sustain patent litigation. This is also not just an issue for gene patents, it implicates 
patents on all health-related biotechnologies.  
Second, and relatedly, even if patentability is questionable, patent holders may still try to 
enforce or to threaten patent infringement if others choose to ignore what they argue is 
covered by their patents. And because patent holders have deeper financial resources, 
a threat to litigate may be enough to stop others carrying out the ‘alleged infringing 
activity’ and patents may go unchallenged, or the patent holder may be able to delay 
proceedings or appeal, thereby extending the time for the patent, or driving up costs of 
litigation to the point that the challenger may have to settle or halt litigation.  
Third, and mostly importantly, issues are exacerbated in the context of patents on health 
because actors likely to be affected by such patents and to challenge them are patients 
who may have limited resources, or hospitals. Hospitals have limited budgets which must 
be managed carefully to deal with patients’ medical needs. Using a significant sum of 
money in patent litigation would reduce such overall hospital funds for other patients and 
arguably, this would be extremely difficult to justify for any public health facility. Hospitals 
may also be affiliated with universities, who themselves may have patents on similar 
technologies, and hence permission to initiate litigation may not be granted, if there is a 
conflict of interest. 
                                                          
101 For example, see: James Bessen; Michael J. Meurer, “The Private Costs of Patent Litigation” (2012) 9 J.L. 
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by Maurice Blackburn lawyers providing pro-bono assistance, together with financial support from Cancer Voices 
Australia and Yvonne D’Arcy’s who used own personal finances.  
103For example, in the CHEO case, the lawyers for CHEO acted on a pro-bono basis and devoted “their time, 
unpaid, to administer the case from beginning to end.”  The lawyers also secured commitment from scientists to 
provide expert testimony on a pro-bono basis, and the team worked on the case with Prof Richard Gold, McGill 
University and his research team, supported by a Genome Canada, Genome Alberta and Genome Quebec grant. 
Statement of ‘Gilbert LLP: Breaking the Gene Patent Barrier’ available at 
http://www.cheo.on.ca/uploads/genetics/Gene%20patent/Lawsuit%20backgrounder_FINAL.pdf 




For these reasons, once granted, patents are difficult to challenge because such 
challenges are often highly time-consuming and resource intensive.104 This in turn 
means that legal challenges have a limited correctional effect in such contexts.  
 
Part IV. Conclusion 
This article has sought to demonstrate that gene patent challenges in Canada, Australia, 
the US, and Europe, have been driven by concerns related to healthcare implications of 
such patents. Despite this, these jurisdictions, have failed to engage with such healthcare 
implications in a meaningful way when challenges are brought within patent law. The 
only exception to this is Canada, where solutions outside patent law, via licensing, have 
been devised specifically to deliver access to technologies under patent by focusing on 
the public health issues at stake, in a manner that could be used for other technologies, 
by other entities and in other jurisdictions.  
 
Such licensing approaches arguably offer a more meaningful solution from a public 
health perspective than the technical patent law interpretations offered within the US and 
Australian in the Myriad cases. This is because in the US and Australia although patents 
are no longer available on isolated genes which is undoubtedly an important 
achievement, however, this does not have broader applicability for patents on future 
technologies raising healthcare concerns. Under such judicial approaches, new cases 
need to be taken for each new type patented technology which will be both time and 
resource intensive. Similarly, such licensing solutions are preferable to the current 
approach within European law. This is because although European law contains 
exclusions from patentability which could be used to limit patents on technologies with 
healthcare implications, these are interpreted narrowly in practice. A gap between patent 
law and health concerns is evident, and the two areas continue to speak past but not to 
each other. Hence, solutions outside patent law are warranted. 
 
Put simply, at a substantive level patent law appears institutionally configured to adopt 
technical interpretations of exclusions from patentability, rather than engage with the 
broader health-related issue at stake. Moreover, power asymmetries within the current 
systems mean that stakeholders affected by patents on health-related technologies are 
likely to have less resources to challenge these than patent holders will have to defend 
them, which makes the likelihood of successful challenges rare.  As technologies 
develop and we enter the fields of personalised medicines and whole genome 
sequencing, the potential healthcare implications of patents on biotechnologies are likely 
to increase. Patent law is failing to engage with such issues, and this lends further 
credence for the need to consider solutions outside patent law.  
In short, unless and until we are not going to adopt fundamental institutional change 
within patent law, it behoves us to take seriously and devise appropriately, solutions 
outside patent law to address the potential healthcare implications of patents. For such 
reasons, at a practical level, the solution offered by tailored licensing approaches in the 
                                                          
104 EPO Opposition Division proceedings in Europe are a useful alternative for anyone to raise an objection to 
European patents, however, such proceedings can only be brought within a limited time of the patent being granted 
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Canadian context, although not without shortcomings, is arguably a preferable solution 
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